1)      The phenomenal concept strategy: This is one of the main strategies for defending physicalism from conceivability arguments. The main idea is to offer an explanation of the explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal truths in terms of the special semantic features of our phenomenal concepts. After having defended in my PhD the strategy from recent important general objections from Chalmers and Stoljar, I plan to focus on its positive aspects, by elaborating and defending my own version of the phenomenal concept strategy, and comparing it with alternative versions. In particular, I will examine different accounts of phenomenal concepts (indexical, quotational, recognitional, and others), and I will assess their perspectives. My own version is a new variant of the recognitional account. My working hypothesis is that this account is the most plausible account of phenomenal concepts, and moreover, we can use it to provide a satisfactory explanation of the explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal truths, and therefore, to formulate a sound version of the phenomenal concept strategy. I plan to turn this material into two papers, tentatively entitled “Phenomenal Concepts: Recognitional, Indexical or Quotational?” and “Explaining the Explanatory Gap: Developing the Recognitional Account”.

 

2)       Two-Dimensional Semantics: In my PhD I examine the crucial tenet of two-dimensionalism, namely, that a sentence S is a priori if and only if S is true in every possible world considered as actual. I argued that, if we understand possible worlds considered as actual as involving metaphysically possible worlds, then that central claim of two-dimensionalism is simply wrong. Following the lead of Chalmers and others, I would like to explore the prospects of versions of two-dimensionalism without that false commitment, that is, a version according to which possible worlds considered as actual are merely epistemic possibilities. I plan to write a paper on this topic, provisionally entitled “The Nature of Epistemic Possibilities”. Furthermore, I plan to defend this weaker version of two-dimensionalism from recent, important objections such as those by Soames and others. I intend to turn this material into a paper entitled “Descriptions, Reference and the Semantics of ‘Actually’”.

 

3)      Conceptual Analysis and Gender Concepts: In my PhD I am also concerned with more general issues in semantics, such as the nature of concepts and conceptual analysis. In my future research, I plan to further explore the perspectives of conceptual analysis and conceptual methods in other areas. In particular, I would like to develop and apply my ideas on the nature of concepts, concept-possession and conceptual analysis to some interesting and puzzling concepts in normative philosophy, namely, concepts of a social nature, such as race, gender and sexual orientation, and derogatory concepts. The first paper I plan to write on these topics is provisionally entitled “The Concept ‘Woman’: A Two-Dimensional Account”.