PAPERS ON CONSCIOUSNESS
Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy)
(This is mostly a reply to D. Stoljar's "Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts", Mind and Language 20, 2005.)
Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain the Explanatory Gap?
(This is a reply to D. Chalmers' "Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap", in Alter & Walter (eds.) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, OUP 2007.)
The Conceivability Argument Against Behaviourism
(This paper discusses Stoljar's comparison of the conceivability argument against physicalism and the conceivability argument against behaviourism, which can be found in Stoljar (2005) above, Stoljar's bookIgnorance and Imagination, and Stoljar's "Two Conceivability Arguments Compared", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2007.)
How Many Explanatory Gaps Are There?
(This is a commentary on G. Harman's "Explaining an Explanatory Gap", APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, Fall 2007.)
PAPERS ON PHYSICALISM
We are living in a material world (and I am a material girl) (forthcoming in Teorema, in a special issue on Phenomenal Consciousness and Naturalism)
(This paper discusses the notion of physicalism presupposed by conceivability arguments against physicalism and argues that it is well motivated.)
PAPERS ON SOCIAL KINDS
Social Kinds and Conceptual Change
(This paper is a reply to S. Haslanger's "Philosophical Analysis and Social Kinds: What Good Are Our Intuitions?", in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2006, Supplementary Volume.)